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Since the inception of cognitive psychology dominant theories of memory behavior have used the
storage metaphor. In the multi-store models (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968;
Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) the memory system comprises one or more short-term memory (STM)
stores and a long-term memory (LTM) store. These stores are places where information is located
for varying periods of time (i.e., seconds in the STM stores, and minutes to lifetime in the LTM
store) and they have varying capacity limits: large for the LTM store, very limited for the STM
store—4 to 7 items, see Miller (1956), Broadbent (1958), and Cowan (2001)1. Expertise research
has shown that experts are able to remember a large amount of information presented immediately
before testing their memory (e.g., more than 80 items in Chase and Ericsson, 1982 and in Gobet
and Simon, 1996), suggesting that they are superseding the normal capacity limits of the STM store.
However, given that this effect only occurs with domain-specific material expertise theoreticians
(e.g., Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995; Gobet and Simon, 1996) explained these results in terms of the
use of retrieval structures (see explanation below), but they retained the partition between STM and
LTM stores.
In this article I adumbrate an alternative explanation that builds upon three sources: (i) the
behaviorist conception of memory as behavior (Delaney and Austin, 1998); (ii) models of memory
that exclude the STM store (e.g., Nairne, 1992; Fuster, 1997; Neath, 1998; Cowan, 1999; Oberauer,
2002; Conway et al., 2005; McClelland et al., 2010); (iii) Gobet and Simon’s (1996) and Ericsson
and Kintsch’s (1995) emphasis on the role of expertise in memory, and their pioneer theoretical
conceptualization of retrieval structures. In the remaining of the article I briefly discuss these three
sources, and then I present the alternative explanation and draw some conclusions.
MEMORY AS BEHAVIOR
Delaney and Austin (1998)’s article “Memory as behavior” put forward a behaviorist approach
to memory, which opposes the cognitive approaches based on stores. It draws from Chase and
Ericsson (1982)’s investigation of strategies used by memory experts, including the use of retrieval
structures. In the behaviorist approach memory phenomena are not things that happen to passive
organisms; instead, organisms are active in producing those phenomena. People use more or less
useful strategies to remember things, and these strategies constitute an essential aspect of memory
behavior. This contrasts with the cognitive tradition of memory research in which the use of
strategies is avoided because they “contaminate” the “pure” capacity of the STM store. From this
approach I value the importance of strategies and the criticism to the attempts to measuring a pure
1Note that for some authors the limitation is in the attentional resources rather than in the capacity of the STM store (e.g.,
Pashler and Johnston, 1998; Barrouillet and Camos, 2001). Due to space limitations I will not address this approach. Suffice it
to say that my criticism applies to both views.
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memory capacity. However, unlike this approach, my alternative
approach incorporates internal structures.
ELIMINATING THE STM STORE
Postulating the existence of a STM store implies that this store has
different characteristics to the LTM store. Theoreticians consider
that in order to estimate the pure limits of the STM store the use
of strategies should be avoided, for example, by presenting to-
be-remembered items very quickly, or by requesting participants
to repeat unrelated syllables (e.g., the–the) in order to avoid
participants rehearsing items or using more elaborate strategies
such as generating images of the items combined with locations
(e.g., the method of loci, see Guida and Lavielle-Guida, 2014 for
a discussion).
Aiming at eliminating strategies to measure the limited
capacity of the STM store is misleading because previous
knowledge is an essential aspect of memory behavior; thus, the
phenomenon of interest is severely disrupted. I illustrate this
with an example. Consider that exercise scientists would like
to measure the pure vertical jumping capacity of humans. The
high jumping competitions in athletics are ruled out because
athletes use strategies that “contaminate” the pure jumping
capacity such as running following a semi-circled trajectory,
using their arms to aid their jump, etc. The pure jumping capacity
might be measured with a vertical jump without running. But,
how pure is that? People can still use their arms to aid their
jump. Requesting participants to use a straitjacket while they
are performing their vertical jump would help, but it would not
be enough because people can still bend their knees and lower
down their bodies before jumping vertically. Moreover, even if
we restrict all the movements of all the joints not involved in
vertical jumping people can still contract their muscles without
producing movement. Summing up, the pure vertical jumping
capacity is an illusion.
Likewise, the intellectual straitjackets used to measure pure
STM store capacity do not achieve their goal because using
previous knowledge is essential to remember things over
the short-term. Moreover, previous knowledge participates at
different stages of producing memory behavior. As established by
the researchers of the Gestalt school of perception (Wertheimer,
1923; Koffka, 1935), we use our previous knowledge to organize
stimuli into familiar ways of grouping, regular shapes, and closed
contours. At a “purer” level, in a printed sheet of paper we use our
knowledge to perceive lines, dots and curves, not arrangements
of ink molecules. Consequently, the whole idea of a limited
STM store should be abandoned. Remembering things that were
experienced a few moments ago always involves the assistance
of previous knowledge, strategies, and abilities. Trying to avoid
their involvement not only severely disrupts the phenomenon
one aims to investigate, but it is also destined to fail.
Many cognitive psychologists have abandoned the concept
of the short-term memory store (e.g., Hintzman, 1986; Nairne,
1992; Fuster, 1997; Neath, 1998; Cowan, 1999; Oberauer, 2002;
Conway et al., 2005; Versace et al., 2014) proposing that short-
term memory is the part of long-term memory that is currently
active, or the part of long-term memory that is currently in the
focus of attention, or part of the conscious experience. A different
approach that also discards the STM store considers memory
phenomena as the emergent property of the functioning of a
network (e.g., Botvinick and Plaut, 2006; McClelland et al., 2010;
Hasson et al., 2015). These conceptions are closer to the view I
am expounding here, albeit insufficient. My criticism is that they
rarely take into account the strategies and previous knowledge
being used to be able to remember things that occur a few seconds
ago (but see, MacDonald and Christiansen, 2002).
EXPERTISE, STRATEGIES, AND
RETRIEVAL STRUCTURES
Chase and Ericsson (1981) trained two university students to
improve their performance in a STM task from a normal
score of seven digits to more than 80 digits. In my view this
finding should have been taken as a refutation of the models
including a fixed limited-capacity STM store. However, the
authors preferred to maintain the extant models and introduced
the concept of retrieval structures to account for the student’s
exceptional memory performance. These students were athletes,
and they used their knowledge of typical running times in
different competitions as retrieval structures. For example, the
digit sequence 9-5-8 could be associated to the retrieval structure
“Usain Bolt’s world record” (which is 9.58 s for the 100 meters
race). Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) proposed the long-term
working memory (LTWM) theory, which generalizes the use of
retrieval structures to account for performance in all domains
of expertise, including language. They proposed that experts
circumvent the limits of the STM store, not by increasing its
capacity (which is fixed), but by using their LTM store as a
working memory (through the use of retrieval structures).
A different type of retrieval structure was proposed by Gobet
and Simon (1996): the template. The difference between the
more typical retrieval structures and the templates is that the
former are voluntarily developed with the purpose of improving
performance in memory tasks, whereas the later are by-products
of acquiring expertise in a field. Moreover, templates consist of
a core—a configuration of stimuli that frequently appear in the
domain of expertise—and slots in which additional information
or less frequent stimuli could be added. Gobet and Simon
also proposed that the STM store has a limited capacity and
that experts circumvent their limits by storing pointers of the
templates in the STM store.
These two proposals represented a step forward in the
understanding of memory phenomena. However, mainstream
research into short-termmemory did not pay too much attention
to these proposals, probably because mainstream memory
researchers are not interested on the influence of the LTM store
on the STM store; rather, they are still interested in avoiding
such “contamination,” thus they evade studyingmaterial in which
people possess some degree of expertise.
THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
I propose that we should go a step further and consider retrieval
structures as the core of the mechanism underlying remembering
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things experienced moments ago. Before making this proposal
let me tweak the concept of retrieval structure. As useful as it
is, the concept of retrieval structure has two problems: First,
it was developed under the storage metaphor. These structures
are called “retrieval” structures because they retrieve information
from the LTM store, which is transferred into the STM store.
As I indicated earlier, the STM store does not belong in my
alternative explanation. Second, these structures do much more
than retrieving information. In Gobet and Simon’s view these
structures are at the core of thinking processes. Therefore, I will
refer to these structures as knowledge structures.
Now for my explanation, remembering things over the short
term is a phenomenon that requires explanation. The way we
remember things is not a passive process in which incoming
information remain in a store. Remembering things is an active
process that starts before the to-be-remembered information
is presented. Based on our current goal we activate the most
relevant knowledge structures, and we combine them with
incoming information. The success in remembering things that
occurred a short-term earlier depends on how relevant the
knowledge structures are for the task at hand, the amount
of information to be remembered, and the time we have to
remember this information. In the case we do not seem to have
any relevant knowledge structure (e.g., if we are presented with
irregular, novel shapes) we use a very simple knowledge structure:
a spatial structure with empty locations which could be filled in
with incoming information. This knowledge structure coincides
with the slotted structure proposed in traditional models of STM
(e.g., Luck and Vogel, 1997), but, unlike those models, it is one of
a myriad of knowledge structures we can use to try to make sense
and/or memorize incoming information. Moreover, such simple
knowledge structure is not free of previous knowledge. There is
evidence that in memory tasks people use their experience with
reading, and tend to fill the slots from left to right (e.g., van
Dijck and Fias, 2011; Guida and Lavielle-Guida, 2014) unless
their native language is read from right to left (e.g., Zebian,
2005).
Nonetheless, unless one is a baby it is very rare not to
possess relevant knowledge. Thus, in most cases we remember
things over the short term by activating domain or task specific
knowledge structures. The reason why the typical performance in
STM tasks seems to be limited is due to the artificial straitjackets
typically used to measure memory performance.
IMPLICATIONS
My explanation has two main implications that, I hope,
inspire future memory research: First, the expertise approach to
investigate memory behavior should be taken seriously because
we all have certain degree of expertise in performing different
tasks (e.g., expertise in face recognition, expertise in speaking
one language). Second, this view may shed light on the problem
of understanding infants’ deficient memory behavior. If building
knowledge structures is essential to remember things, the reason
why infants have poor memory performance might be that they
have very few knowledge structures, not because their STM store
is not yet developed or that they have insufficient attentional
resources.
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